Nor do we need - Psychology

Nor do we need Post Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2008 9:28:00 +0000
And that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I am about to say on this subject, I advise those who are not versed in Anatomy, before they commence the perusal of these observations, to take the trouble of getting dis sected in their presence the heart of some large animal possessed of lungs, (for this is throughout sufficiently like the human), and to have shewn to them its two ventricles or cavities: in the first place, that in the right side, with which correspond two very ample tubes, viz, the hollow vein, (vena cava 3 ) which is the princi pal receptacle of the blood, and the trunk of the tree, as it were, of which all the other veins in the body are branches; and the arterial vein, (vena arteriosa,) inappropriately so denominated, since it is in truth only an artery, which, taking its rise in the heart, is divided, after passing out from it, into many branches which presently disperse themselves all over the lungs; in the second place, the cavity in the left side, with which correspond in the same manner two canals in size equal to or larger than the pre ceding, viz, the venous artery, (arteria venosa,} likewise inap propriately thus designated, because it is simply a vein which comes from the lungs, where it is divided into many branches, interlaced with those of the arterial vein, and those of the tube called the windpipe, through which the air we breathe enters; and the great artery which, issuing from the heart, sends its branches all over the body. I should wish also that such persons were care fully shewn the eleven pellicles which, like so many small valves, open and shut the four orifices that are in these two cavities, viz, three at the entrance of the hollow vein, where they are disposed in such a maner as by no means to prevent the blood which it contains from flowing into the right ventricle of the heart, and yet exactly to prevent its flowing out; three at the entrance to the arterial vein, which, arranged in a manner exactly the opposite of the former, readily permit the blood contained in this cavity to pass into the lungs from returning to this cavity; and, in like manner, two others at the mouth of the venous artery, which allow the blood from the lungs to flow into the left cavity of the heart, but preclude its return; and three at the mouth of the great artery, which suffer the blood to flow from the heart, but prevent its reflux. Nor do we need to seek any other reason for the number of these pellicles beyond this that the orifice of the venous artery being of an oval shape from the nature of its situation, can be adequately closed with two, whereas the others being round are more conveniently closed with three.

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1. - They are the ejects Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:46:29 +0000
Physics, as we have seen, resolves its world into phenomena and underlying grounds or substances. The phenomena are the symbols of the underlying substances or forces, while these are the hidden but uniform and stable forces which are causally related to the phenomenal effects. They are the ejects of the physical world, and the grounds on which science holds them to be necessary are identical with the grounds on which the reflective consciousness asserts the existence of physical ejects.

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2. - That the physical eject exists Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:30:48 +0000
The reflective basis of our knowledge here is an inference which takes the form of the rationally necessary. But this inference rests on the more intimate and direct certitude of the spontaneous consciousness. That the physical eject exists as real we have the united testimony of both spontaneity and reflec- tion.

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3. - And being but an ordinary Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:20:20 +0000
The definition of the character of this ejective existence is a matter of inference and analogy. To the dog its nature will express itself mainly in its dogged obstinacy in blocking his way. And being but an ordinary dog, his idea of the nature of the cause of his troubles will contain a great many kyno-morphic elements, just as that of the plain man will reveal elements which are anthropo-morphic.

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4. - But in con- nection Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:02:55 +0000
It is only in the critical reflection of physics that we find these elements carefully eliminated and the characteriza- tion reduced to the minimum of the necessary. What, then, does modern physics say regarding the nature of these physical ejects? As to their nature as things in themselves, it professes to know nothing. But in con- nection with its scientific aims it is obliged to regard them as the ground-causes of the phenomenal world.

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5. - If force, we then emphasize Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 15:52:12 +0000
And while it is in a state of unstable equilibrium on the question whether these physical existences are to be regarded as matter, force, ether, or something beyond its present ken, there is no uncertainty as to whether some ground- causes of a physical character are essential; nor is there any doubt as to what the most fundamental attributes of these must be. If we call them matter, we put the empha- sis on persistence, inertia and stability. If force, we then emphasize agency and causal energy.

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6. - And it does this all Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 15:38:27 +0000
If ether, we accent the desideratum of a perfect medium for motion. 1 Physics thus defines its ejects in terms of strict inferential neces- sity, as persistent inert and stable substances ; as mechani- cally acting causes and as perfect media for the initiation and propagation of motions. And it does this all consist- ently with its general profession of ignorance as to the nature of things.

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7. - How do we know Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 15:25:45 +0000
For these characterizations are not the results of immediate insight into the nature of the world, but are rather rational inferences from the world of phe- nomena regarded, as physics regards them, as symbolizing something deeper than themselves. We come to the last of our classes of real existences, that of ejects which are other selves. How do we know the real existence of other selves? We have already alluded to Professor Strongs reference of our assertion of other selves to an original race-instinct and we have contended that an instinct which merely registered repeated experiences in the form of habit would not be adequate; whereas, instinct in any other sense would be identical with some form of spontaneous reason.

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8. - The symbol is simply Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 15:07:34 +0000
If used in this latter sense we have no objection. The instinct which Professor Strong asserts would then be the immediate causal reference, by the dog in the illustration, of its metaphysical experience to a real existence which as a dog it does not distinguish from the bunch of perceptions standing as its symbol but which nevertheless means something entirely different from that symbol. The symbol is simply the object of the dogs per- ceptions, whereas what the dog cares for and means, is the thing which caused his rebuff.

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9. - Let us, in view Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 14:48:10 +0000
The experience as so far denned would be the same, however, whether the rebuffing thing be a tree or another dog, or a man. The distinction of the two species of ejects would arise in connection with a further process of characterization. Let us, in view of this, attempt a further analysis of the dogs experience.

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10. - We here come upon Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 14:28:19 +0000
We saw how his idea of the nature of the thing which rebuffed him would be penetrated with kyno-morphic ele- ments which his later experiences with physical things would tend gradually to eliminate. It is highly probable, however, that his first characterization would approximate much more closely to the nature of dogs than to that of trees, simply because the agent of the experiences is a dog. We here come upon what Professor Strong would no doubt call an original instinct of characterization, an instinct the law of which might be stated as follows.

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