From the description of inanimate

From the description of inanimate Post Date: Mon, 1 Sep 2008 10:02:28 +0000
I was not, however, disposed, from these circumstances, to conclude that this world had been created in the manner I de scribed; for it is much more likely that God made it at the first such as it was to be. But this is certain, and an opinion commonly received among theologians, that the action by which he now sus tains it is the same with that by which he originally created it; so that even although he had from the beginning given it no other form than that of chaos, provided only he had established certain laws of nature, and had lent it his concurrence to enable it to act as it is wont to do, it may be believed, without discredit to the miracle of creation, that, in this way alone, things purely material might, in course of time, have become such as we observe them at present; and their nature is much more easily conceived when they are beheld coming in this manner gradually into existence, than when they are only considered as produced at once in a finished and perfect state. From the description of inanimate bodies and plants, I passed to animals, and particularly to man.

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1. - Through this Sturm und Drang Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 20:09:53 +0000
If we ask what self it is the dog knows, we shall be led by the preceding analysis to say that it is his volitional self ; the self of his prime agency ; the self of that struggle of his to realize his destiny in his world. The very singular circumstance about the affair is that it is not the phenomenal self, the subject of mere perception, of which the dog becomes aware and which guides him in his reaction, but his deeper metaphysical self ; the self that energizes in the efforts he puts forth for survival ; the self of feeling and effort; the self that experiences the storm and stress of life. Through this Sturm und Drang, con- sciousness spontaneously apprehends itself in the form of a practical agent in pursuit of its own well-being.

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2. - The reflective consciousness builds Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:59:06 +0000
Its experience is thus metaphysical and it knows itself as a real existent rather than as a mere phenomenon. We say, then, that the self of the spontaneous consciousness is known immediately and metaphysically. The reflective consciousness builds on the foundation of spontaneity, and though its processes are mediate and its business to trans- late its whole available material into the idea or conception of self, yet this result of reflection carries with it much of the immediate force of the spontaneous intuition.

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3. - The general doctrine maintained throughout Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:45:30 +0000
The intimacy of the self-idea with the self -intuition is so per- fect that it is only when we compel ourselves to reflect critically that we are able to realize that the whole is not direct intuition. Secondly, how do we come to know objects which are not self? We do little more here than sum up the results of former discussion. The general doctrine maintained throughout this treatise is that the cognitive processes proper do not take the initiative, but are called forth by the exigen- cies of the real struggle of the agent for survival.

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4. - A dog does not know Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:27:44 +0000
The dog did not perceive the real tree or stone until he ran against it and experienced the painful consequences. His cognition of the object then unfolded as a symbol of a deeper reality fraught with momentous consequences, and its function was to render the collision with the deeper reality avoidable. A dog does not know all this, of course, but it all happens just in that way.

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5. - Now, it has already been Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:17:12 +0000
Recognizing this and calling the cognitive object which arises, the phenomenal object symbolizing a deeper reality, our concern here is with this phenomenal object. We wish to know how we became aware of its being a symbol of the not-self, rather than a symbol of self. Now, it has already been pointed out how the first definitions of the world arise as objective rather than subjective, and we have only to conceive this process as completing itself in order to reach a doctrine of objectivity that would be adequate to refute subjective idealism.

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6. - We may not be able Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 19:02:02 +0000
For what subjective idealism asserts is not simply that our objects are bunches of per- ceptions, but that these perceptions represent nothing but modifications of consciousness. If, however, they have objective character from the outset and do not acquire it somewhere along the road, it is gratuitous to maintain that they represent nothing but modifications of consciousness. We may not be able to find any objective existence which they can mean, but their pure objective character enjoins us from the exclusive subjective reference.

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7. - In calling the object Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 18:46:36 +0000
Nevertheless, while this is a sufficient refutation of subjective idealism, it is not the whole doctrine of the object. In our experience the objectivity of the phe- nomenon is inseparably bound up with its symbolic charac- ter. In calling the object a phenomenon we have virtually called it a symbol, and this connects its cognition with the deeper world which it symbolizes.

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8. - It arises, as we Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 18:35:24 +0000
How does the bunch of perceptions we call the object come to possess this sym- bolic character? We have already answered in our analy- sis of the dogs experience. It acquires its symbolic character through the mediation of the deeper experience of the dog, connecting him with the permanent substances or forces of the world. It arises, as we have seen, as a perceptual symbol of that deeper objective reality, and this, in the last analysis, grounds its objectivity and forever precludes the subjective interpretation.

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9. - Our doctrine of the object Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 18:21:47 +0000
Let us call the phenomenal object a bunch of perceptions. Their very form as perceptions constitutes their obvious ob- jective character. Our doctrine of the object completes itself when we discover further that this bunch of per- ceptions, by virtue of this objective character, stands as the symbol of a reality which is objective to the deeper self.

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10. - The eject in general Post Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2008 18:01:49 +0000
Now the primary assertion of this is an affair of the spon- taneous consciousness and it is on this primary datum as a basis that the reflective consciousness builds up its devel- oped affirmation of the objective world. We pass now to the consideration of ejects (1) of the physical type and (2) other selves. The eject in general is not a direct affirmation of the cognitive consciousness.

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